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A. Introducti on G2 06 50
The subject of this paper is the nature of the boundaries 
between the defense establishment and the civilian sector in 
Israel, seen from the point of view of institutional linkages 
and formal networks.
One of the reasons for our choice of this particular 
research subject was that, despite its centrality in the context 
of the relationship between elites in general and civilian and 
military elites in particular, the society and the military, 
institutional linkages and networks have not been comprehensively 
dealt with on either a theoretical or an empirical level. The 
question of boundaries between institutional frameworks is of 
fundamental interest and importance in the social sciences.’*’
Both sociologists and political scientists like to describe the 
social history of societies as a history of structural 
and functional differentiation. Processesof differentiation 
usually produce changes in the location and nature of inter- 
institutional boundaries. The pace of change of the inter- 
institutional boundaries depends, of course, on the force 
of the pressures acting on them and their ability to resist 
them. Even the professional armed forces, their notorious 
conservatism notwithstanding, had. to respond to these external 
and internal pressures by re-defining and re-locating the 




























































































and the institutional linkages between them.
The examples by which we shall illustrate our conceptual analysis 
will be drawn from the case of Israel. Israel is unique in many 
respects including the existing relations between society and the 
military. However, Israel's case is not exceptional. This allows 
its conclusions to be generalized to and compared with those in 
other countries, and especially those in Western democracies.
From the War of Independence onward there has been a fundamental 
ideological consensus in Israel which has covered almost the whole 
range of the political spectrum. This consensus concerns the bound 
aries between the defense and civilian establishments, in general 
and elites in particular, even though the application of the fund­
amental principles of this consensus has occasionally given rise to 
acute controversies. This fundamental consensus has been aided by 
ideological-normative linkages between the military establishement 
and the mainstream of socio-political trends of the Israeli society 
We can support this proposition by a few examples from the spheres 
of the political-military doctrine and the social ethos.
Since the War of Independence, including the period following the 
political change of 1977, direct and indirect evidence indicates 
that there has been a high degree of consensus between the majority 
view of the general staff, especially the decisive view of the 
Chief of Staff himself, and the main trends within the coalition. 
One expression of this consensus was the similarity of interpreta­
tion of the international and middle-eastern scene. Disagreements 
within both the general staff and the successive governments not­
withstanding, it was the "realpolitik" that has been guiding both 
elites up to this day. Moreover, there has been both fundamental 
and operative consensus between the two elites with regard to the 
substance of the desirably political culture, viz., self-identifica 




























































































prevailing today, or the social-democratic variety which was dominant 
2before 1977.
The situation in the sphere of social ethos resembles that in the
political field. There have always been mutual influences in such
matters as status symbols, nature of discipline, attitudes toward
ceremonies, patterns of entertainment, style of dress etc. in spite
of the well-known tendency of military establishments to foster
3their own particular codes of behavior. Nevertheless, even in this 
respect, the gap between the two sectors in Israel seems to be among 
the narrowest known in the Western democratic societies, let alone 
most of the non-democratic ones. To the extent that changes in the 
social ethos of the IDF did occur, they have followed in the wake of 
general change in the civilian society, and have been perceived as 
negative both by the IDF commanders and by the political and social 
leadership.̂
These convergent processes have no doubt been aided, at least until 
now, by the existence of numerous and varied institutional linkages. 
Especially noteworthy in this context are the social and professional 
networks which developed due to the existence of an extensive and 
active reserves system. Other relevant factors are the sources of 
officer recruitment and the early retirement of the senior commanding 
staff. Data on officer recruitment sources indicate that - at least 
up to the seventies - the manpower pool which supplied IDF officers 
has matched almost exactly, at each level of the hierarchy, the man­
power pool from which the younger generation of politicains, public
5administrators, academicians, artists etc. came . These sources of 
officer and other elite recruitment can be described, albeit with 
some over-simplification as mainly veteran and Ashkenazi, urban or 
kibbutz and moshav based. Though this similarity of background is 
not sufficient by itself to ensure homogeneity of views and attitudes, 
it seems nevertheless a necessary condition. The early retirement 




























































































ethos, which might be conducive to cultivation of a strategy of well- 
defined boundaries of divergence, distance and separation from the 
civilian sector.
B. The Conceptual Framework
Survey of literature in search of a comprehensive conceptual base for 
the treatment of the question of boundaries has yielded rather modest 
results. A substantive contribution has been made by Karl Deutsch, 
who analysed inter-institutional boundaries in terms of (a) internal 
and external communication, and (b) memory facilities. (Deutsch, 1956; 
Deutsch, 1966: 205-209). A systematic treatment of this subject can 
be found in Easton. Though dealing with boundaries almost exclusively 
in the context of political systems, he does suggest some more gen­
erally applicable indicators, which, in contrast to Deutsch's approach, 
are of structural-organizational nature. (Easton, 1965: 69; Almond, 
1965). Luckham offers a typology and describes the characteristics 
of boundaries pertaining directly to the relationship between the 
military and the political systems (Luckham, 1971) . In fact, his 
is the only practical typology, as far as this subject is concerned, 
to be found today in the literature of military sociology.
It may be remembered that Luckham distinguishes between integral, 
permeable and fragmental boundaries. (Luckham, 1971: 17-18). He 
suggests the following indices which should help to discriminate 
between the different boundary types: (Luckham, 1971: 17-18).
(a) the extent to which the military establishment exercises 
control over interaction of its personnel at various levels 
with its non-military environment;
(b) the extent to which there is a fusion of the goals and 
organizations of the military and the civilian sectors.




























































































one in which "the extent to which the interchange between persons 
holding roles at various levels of the military hierarchy and the 
environment are under the control of those with responsibility for 
setting the operational goals of the armed forces that is the higher 
command is optimal".
A permeable boundary, in contrast to this, is one in which "there 
is a complete fusion both in respect of goals and of organization 
between the possessors of the means of violence and other social 
groups."
A fragmental boundary is one in which the military establishment - 
although distinctive in its goal and organizations - does not 
effectively control the interaction of its personnel with holders 
of civilian roles, thus impairing "the capacity of the holders of 
military roles to interact with the political and social environ­
ment as a single entity in a consistent manner."
Like any typology, whatever its degree of clarity, this one also 
raises some questions that need further clarification. Although 
this is not the place for a systematic treatment of the subject, 
we would like to make a few comments in this context.
First, in his discussion of conditions leading to, or, conversely, 
impairing the formation of different boundary types, Luckham indi­
cates several important variables affecting these conditions:
- the structural differentiation between the two sectors;
- the nature of the functions of the military;
- the degree of cohesiveness of the armed forces. (Luckham,
1971: 18-20) .
It seems, however, that these "conditions" are rather symptoms of 
more basic processes, ignored by Luckham, viz., those of convergence 




























































































the various civilian sectors on the other.
The convergence process means that the two sectors, which are rather
different from each other in terms of internal structure, management,
mode of operation and social norms, begin to converge by adoption
of attributes similar or identical to those characteristic to the
6other sectors.
However, this process of attribute development alone does not suf­
fice to indicate the nature of the boundaries, i.e. their inte­
grality, fragmentality or permeability. It is thus possible to 
formulate different hypotheses concerning the possible association 
between convergent processes and boundary types. Thus, e.g. we may 
hypothesize that, as a result of adoption of some 'civilian' function 
by the armed forces (such as research and development, production, 
education, etc.) convergent processes reinforce structural isolation 
of the military establishment and thereby protect the integrity of 
the boundary. As opposed to this, those convergent processes in
7which civilian norms are adopted in the area of economic incentives, 
or in the area of style, cultural patterns or discipline, should blur 
the distinctiveness of the military establishment and make the 
boundary permeable - at least in its above mentioned sections - to 
mutual penetration of ideas and rules of action.
It is possible then to postulate that the evaluation of a common mar­
ket, in which the military and the civilian establishments compete, 
will eventuate in a decrease in the integrality of the boundaries.
The degree of decrease in integrality of these boundaries will be 
determined by the extent of competition for manpower resources and 
social and political legitimacy between the two sectors.
Second, Luckham's typology lacks elaboration concerning the means 
of control over interaction between the military and its environ­




























































































strategies of boundary maintenance in partly permeable sections 
is impaired. This includes the extent of the use of coercion, of 
visual and other symbols, of promotion of the awareness of distinct­
iveness by fostering social distance, of the formation of distinctive 
ideologies, etc.
Finally, the central weakness in Luckham's typology seems to be its 
neglect of the question of types of institutional linkages between 
the defense establishment and various sections of the civilian 
sector. Except for esoteric contacts, traffic across institutional 
boundaries inevitably implies contacts between people from both sides 
of the boundary. Most meetings, especially those involving army 
personnel subordinate to military authority and control, take place 
under some type of institutionalized circumstances. The control dis­
cussed by Luckham is essential not only on the boundaries themselves 
but also, maybe even more so, with regard to the linkages.
It should be noted that for as long as the defense establishment is 
acting in coordination and cooperation with various representatives 
of the civilian sector, institutional linkages will persist regardless 
of the attempt of those responsible for maintaining the boundaries 
to optimalize their integrality. In fact, because the boundary lines 
are cutting across institutional linkages they remain discernible.
In other words, boundaries between the two sectors are interspersed 
with institutional linkages and the absence of such linkages from 
a given section of a boundary is an indicator of a high level of 
integrality of that section.
In view of the importance which we attach to institutional linkages 
in the context of a discussion of boundaries between the military 
establishment and the civilian sector we shall now attempt to present 





























































































Several questions pose themselves in the context of classifications 
of the institutional linkages discussed in this paper:
The first question concerns the composition of the parties to the 
linkage, especailly the personal and, even more importantly, the 
functional-institutional identity of the civilians. The military 
personnel can have a variety of civilian partners in institutional 
linkages such as elected politicians; officials of national and 
local executive authorities (ministries of education, labor, treas­
ury, transport, etc.); representatives of public institutions other 
than state administration (academies, research organizations, prof- 
fessional associations, economic organizations) etc.
The second question concerns the degree of institutionalization of 
the institutional linkage. By this criterion we can distinguish 
various types of linkages such as permanent, mainly task-oriented 
frameworks, some of which are statutory or decree-based; temporary 
fameworks, such as incumbence in political or diplomatic posts by 
military personnel, director-general's committees for specific pro­
jects, adoption of army units bv civilian groups and vice versa, 
ect.; and various ad hoc inquiry committees comprising both milit­
ary personnel and civilians.
The third question is that of the respective status of the parties 
to the linkage. In this context it is important to know whether
it is the military or the civilian party that has the formal and 
the informal veto rights and the decisive vote. This is expecially 
relevant to state frameworks, ministerial, or parliamentary commit­
tees. Although in many cases decision making authority is statutory 
and unambiguous, there are many others in which formal authority 
does not match the de-facto held power. Moreover, it is plausible 
to assume existence of institutional linkages in which there is no 




























































































The fourth question, linked to the last one, is that of the rules 
of the game characteristic of different institutional linkages. 
Depending on circumstances these rules can be competitive or con- 
flictive, (e.g. the need to compete for economic or manpower res­
ources, or conflicts over conceptual differences concerning those 
questions of strategy and power to which both sectors are sensitive) 
An alternative possibility is that the rules of the game are by def­
inition conducive to consensus and cooperation (e.g. various state 
rituals and ceremonies). Various ad hoc committees set up to solve 
specific acute problems, e.g. those concerning the welfare of sold­
iers or para-military organizations, are also characteristic of 
these types of linkages.
The fifth question is that of the control exercised by each sector 
over its representatives. Here too variation is considerable, esp­
ecially if degrees of control are distinguished and ranked. In 
general terms we may assume that in some linkages both sides tend 
toward strict supervision of their representatives as illustrated 
by contacts in the political sphere. A different situation arises 
when only one of the parties is interested in strict control over 
the interaction. This occurs, for example, in the situation of 
contact between representatives of the military and those of the 
mass media, or between the military and trade unions.
The sixth question concerns the domain or the territory to which a 
given institutional linkage belongs. Due to frequent ambiguities 
in the definition of the division of labor between the defense and 
the civilian establishments, the scope of authority and responsib­
ility of each may vary at different times and in different societies 
For example, matters of manpower recruitment, armament purchase and 
military jurisdiction are usually the domain of the defense ministry 
However, there are some par excellence civilian domains, such as 
production for the civilian market. Apart from these two possibili­




























































































belonging to either party, or areas which both parties aspire to 
adopt as their own. In such cases the rules of the game will tend 
to be competitive or conflictive.
The use of this preliminary typology, the validity and reliability 
of which is still to be proven by extensive testing, must not be 
based on the assumption of stability of the institutional linkages 
over time. These linkages tend to assume different characters and 
be differently located along each of the above dimensions. Among 
the many possible reasons for such variation, mention must be made 
of changes in the conception of the desirable boundaries between 
the two sectors held by different elites.
Finally, it should be noted that the criteria suggested above seem 
to be relevant mainly with regard to concrete linkages and less 
applicable to what may be designated as abstract (i.e. mental or 
ideological) linkages. Therefore, we shall refrain from discussing 
the latter in the present context and relate to them rather as 
components of policies and strategies of system boundary maintenance. 
Thus, e.g. cultivation of a characteristic style of life, or typical 
attitutdes vis-a-vis social and political issues by the armed forces 
do constitute a de-facto strategy for reinforcement of the integral 
nature of boundaries, or at least some important portions thereof. On 
the other hand, deliberate blurring of distinctions between the 
mentality and the life style of the military sector and that of the 
mainstream of the civilian sector would indicate an opposite strategy. 
To what extent are the above mentioned indicators applicable to the 
Israeli case?
C. Institutional Linkages between the Defense Establishment and 
Civilian Sectors in Israel




























































































defense establishment and the civilian sector in Israel through analy-
g
■sis of typical linkages in some specific domains. Within this frame-
9work a large number of institutionalized linkages can be discerned. 
However, in the interest of brevity, the presentation will have to be 
rather schematic.
The Political Domain
Some institutional linkages typical for the political domain are the 
Prime Minister's bureau, the cabinet, the Knesset committees (i.e. the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security; the Committee for State 
Control, and the Joint Subcommittee of the Finance and Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committees); the military government in the West Bank and 
various political party forums. What are the attributes of these link­
ages, formed primarily with a view to serve civilian national frame­
works?
First, despite the fact that the main client is the civilian sector, 
the domain with which we are dealing here is usually that of security. 
Thus, e.g. the reason for the contact may be discussion of profes­
sional-military matters (such as response to enemy's action), or pol­
itical-military matters (such as intelligence evaluations). Discus­
sion of these issues belongs to the joint domain of the defense est­
ablishment and political leadership. These linkages evidence many 
symptoms indicating a certain degree of fusion between the defense and 
the civilian-political establishments. It finds expression, for 
instance, in the systematic inclusion of senior army officers in gov­
ernment meetings; in the monopoly held, de-facto, by the military 
intelligence on analysis and evaluation of national security situation; 
in the high ratio of regular army officers serving in what amounts to 
diplomatic posts connected with negotiations with neighboring count­





























































































Second, in most of these linkages, it is the representative of the 
political sector who is, as far as the formal status is concerned, 
the senior partner. This is certainly so with regard to the Prime 
Minister and his ministers. In some other linkages (e.g. joint 
committees comprising representatives of IDF and of the Foreign 
Office, or joint committees of the Defense Ministry with represent­
atives of settlement movements) seniority of status is neither a 
priori defined nor laid down by law.
Third, linkages between representatives of the military and repres­
entatives of elected functionaries of the political establishment 
involve bilateral control and supervision. However, it seems that, 
especially in the last few years, there has been a tendency for the 
control to become more pronounced in the defense sector. This may 
be due to the greater freedom of expression and lower commitment to 
those at the top of the hierarchy in the civilian sector. The rep­
resentatives of the military in most linkages in the domain of pol­
itics, reflect, above all, the positions of the IDF and the Cheif 
of Staff. In comparison, the variation in the views and opinions of 
the civilian representatives is significantly greater, particularly 
so due to the pluralistic and coalition nature of the political 
establishment in Israel.
Fourth, inquiry into the degree of institutionalization of linkages 
in the political domain brings up an interesting finding: there 
seem to be two polar types: (a) linkages characterized by low
institutionalization, such as sporadic meetings, organized in con­
nection with special events of public interest which call for resp­
onse by the political leadership. Such linkages are, e.g. the Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee, or party assemblies in which it has 
been customary, especially in the past, for army officers to appear 
and present their points of view: (b) linkages which show a con­
siderable degree of institutionalization. A typical example is the 




























































































are permanently attached as liaison between the latter and the PM 
and his cabinet. Another institutionalized linkage is the military 
government that once functioned in Israel proper and is functioning 
today in the administered territories.
Fifth, the overt rules of the game incumbent on participants in pol­
itical domains are usually cooperative and solidary. Yet we must not 
overlook the fact that the behavior of a significant number of people 
is also guided by the rules of competition and even of severe conflict. 
Both in the past and at present this has been conspicious in Knesset 
committees, especially those dealing with defense budgets, or when 
representatives of the defense establishment are called upon to res­
pond to public criticism.
The Economic Domain
Due to the considerable weight carried by the defense establishment
in Israel's economy, institutional linkages characteristic of the
economic domain are numerous and varied. The share of the defense
establishment is the economy finds expression primarily in the 
12defense budget and in the size of the manpower employed directly
13or indirectly by the various agencies of the defense establishment 
The representatives of the defense establishment in the economic net­
works are mainly officials of the defense ministry, though in some 
cases they include IDF officers, especailly from technical branches 
such as air force or ordinance corps. The typical linkages in this 
area are associated with the Israeli military industrial complex,
which, relative to population size, national budget and the GNP, is
14among the biggest and most sophisticated in the world.
The production system of armaments and other equipment required by 




























































































with the defense establishment. Some are integral parts of the 
defense ministry or the IDF, others are legally separate corporations, 
even though the defense establishment exercises considerable influ­
ence over the appointment of their directors and members of director­
ates.1  ̂ Still others are in private ownership or partnerships with 
the defense ministry and serve as sub-contractors of the defense 
ministry-owned enterprises. It should be noted that it has been 
the government's policy in the last few years to encourage a shift 
from government ownership to civilian ownership of the defense indu­
stry. This has been done through the conversion of military indust­
rial enterprises into legally and economically autonomous government 
corporations. A tendency has developed to transfer an even greater
part of production to enterprises in the private sector, while aiding
16them through credit and technical advice.
Apart from the defense ministry's production system, whose extensive 
relations with the civilian sector are almost "symbiotic" (Zusman and 
Tolkovsky, 1973: 29-34) a mention should also be made of "Shekem".
This economic venture, which serves the defense and police personnel 
and their families, has grown in the last few years into notably the 
biggest Israeli retail chain selling everything from food to electric 
appliances and furniture. This calls for an extensive network of 
relations with civilian industrial and marketing firms. Another note­
worthy framewore is the "emergency economy command", which may be 
considered, in some respects, the focus of supervision and control over 
those segments of economy and manpower which remain unmobilized during 
a war.
What, then, are the attributes of these various linkages?
First, we should note that these networks serve the defense establish­
ment as well as various state agencies, and individual citizens in the 




























































































here with economic enterprises or regulation of production processes 
intended to meet the interests of all parties concerned, the domain 
is not purely military but rather common to the military and the 
civilian sectors (state, public and private).
Second, the fact that these linkages are in a common domain adds another 
dimension to the question of formal and informal status seniority bet­
ween the two parties: whereas on the political level the civilian part­
ner is manifestly senior, the overall status profile here is rather 
blurred since some of the networks show a clear status advantage of the 
military partner (e.g. those concerned with ordering from civilian sup­
pliers or marketing defense industry's products on civilian markets).
In other networks it is the civilian partner who carries more authority, 
e.g. in the commercial relations system between Shekem and its civilian 
suppliers, or in civilian pojects aided by the army."*""̂  In many situa­
tions no clear definition of authority relations between the partners 
in a linkage has yet been crystallized, e.g. in the framework of
"emergency economy command" or in various committees of director-gen-
18erals dealing with national projects.
Third, despite the absence of a clear hierarchy of authority, the 
control over contacts of defense personnel with their civilian part­
ners is usually exercised more strictly by the defense establishment
»than by its civilian partners. The defense establishment's control 
over the quality items purchased from private suppliers is an example 
of this. However, in many other cases both sides exercise similar 
degrees of control over contacts of their representatives with the 
other side. This bilateral, more or less, balanced type of control, 
is exemplified by the economic networks concerned with marketing of 
the defense industry products on civilian markets, or with joint 
defense and other ministries' committees (such as those that dealt 





























































































Forth, the nature of the business contracted in the economic net­
works usually requires a high degree of institutionalization of the 
linkages. Indeed, over the years, the institutionalized frameworks 
which became established employ permanent staffs to deal with econo­
mic transactions between the defense establishment on the one hand 
and development projects, economic-financial sectors, and civilian 
projects of the other. These transactions are almost equally advant­
ageous for the defense establishment (defense industries, aircraft, 
industry); state frameworks (e.g. in the case of urban development in 
strategically sensitive locations, aid to civilian projects, etc.); 
as well as for individual citizens, who have business dealings with 
the defense establishment.
Fifth, although we are dealing here with economic transactions, con-
flictive rules of the game seem to be only infrequently employed,
while the competitive rules are, no doubt, the more frequent. These
rules are employed by the civilians in their quest to secure orders
from the defense establishment, or by the defense industry, which
19competes with other producers in civilian markets. Thus the various 
economic networks constitute - no less than the political networks - a 
particualr domain as far as the hierarchy of authority and prestige 
among the partners, the nature of controls, degree of institutionali­
zation, and above all, where the typical rules of the game are con­
cerned.
The Educational and Cultural Domain
The educational-cultural activities of the defense establishment in
general and the IDF in particular can be classified into two major
20groups which are distinct from one another. The first type includes 
routine and special educational programs. For example, vocational 
training and recreational services which are provided either for all 




























































































groups within these categories. The objective in this case is to raise 
the educational and cultural standards and to develop vocational skills 
of servicemen and officers on active duty or in the reserves. For 
this purpose the military uses a staff of officers and non-commissioned 
officers as well as civilian professionals. The second type includes 
a system of pre-recruitment educational, recreational and vocational 
training services for special groups. Typical examples are 'Gadna' 
(para-military youth batallions), and military workshops for youth 
aged 16-18. These activities of the second type call for a high degree 
of institutionalization of linkages between the defense establishment 
and civilian educational frameworks. What are then the attributes of 
these numerous and diversified networks?
First, the identity of the client-consumer is different here from that 
of the other networks discussed above. State networks do not directly 
enter the picture as clients. The direct consumers are either indi­
viduals (adult or youth), or the defense establishment, especially 
its military division, i.e. the IDF.
Second, even though the direct client of these services is the defense 
establishment, especially the IDF, the domain is primarily civilian or 
common to the defense and the civilian sectors. Only combat training 
can be seen as belonging to an exclusively military domain.
Third, despite the fact that par excellence military matters are rather 
rare in these linkages, the military partner often enjoys a formal 
status senior to that of the civilian partner. This is so in all mat­
ters connected with the educational and cultural services provided by 
the IDF for special populations, such as the culturally deprived youth. 
It also holds with regard to the status of the IDF representatives in 
charge of the Military Broadcasting Service (Galei Zahal), as well as 





























































































Seniority of the civilian partner characterizes those networks in 
which services such as vocational training are provided by entirely 
civilian schools. Such services, though operated in coordination 
with the defense forces, are not intended to serve exclusively the 
IDF.
Fourth, the seniority of the military partner in a considerable pro­
portion of these networks accounts for the fact that the control of 
the contents of interaction is primarily in the hands of the IDF, 
except in those frameworks which provide services for soldiers in the 
field of general education, e.g. preparatory courses for matriculation. 
Even in such cases, however, it is the IDF authorities who select 
those entitled to enroll in such courses and can thus control the vol­
ume of the population served by them.
Fifth, we are dealing here with educational frameworks which are 
generally well institutionalized, such as schools, seminars, univer­
sities, etc.
Sixth, the rules of the game guiding the activity in these linkages 
are solidary and cooperative, with only one exception, viz., the com­
petition between Galei Zahal (the Military Broadcasting Service) and 
Shidurei Israel (the Israel Broadcasting Service). Incidentally, it 
is interesting to note that Galei Zahal seems to have a lead, especi­
ally among the young listeners.
The Professional Domain
In this context professional networks mean those situations in which 
personnel of the defense establishment (officers and civilians) meet 
either within the defense establishment or outside of it, with their 
civilian professional and occupational counterparts. Typical examples 




























































































airforce, etc. function along with reserves officers called up for 
active service; cooperation between the Defense Ministry's research 
division and civilian research institutions; all professional contacts 
among the military personnel (engineers, doctors, psychologists, 
sociologists, etc.) with their civilian colleagues.
The attributes of these linkages are, generally, clear and unambiguous. 
First, the professional dimension indicates that the domain is common 
to both sides, and that both sides derive utility from these meetings. 
Yet, the subjects dealt with on the occasions of such meetings are 
more often than not military rather than civilian, especially in the 
case of reservists working in unit headquarters when called up for 
active service, or in the case of military frameworks employing civ­
ilian research workers.
Second, it follows from the above that with regard to both status 
and exercise of control, the military partner is in most cases the 
senior one. It is also he who carries the responsibility for the 
maintenance of permanent linkages and their institutionalization.
The exceptions here are sporadic meetings between social scientists 
serving in the army and their civilian counterparts.
Third, the typical rules of the game in these networks are solidary 
and cooperative, though we must not ignore the element of personal 
and instititutional competition which generally characterizes contacts 
between professionals in both theoretical and applied areas.
The Domain of Social Networks
Almost all types of networks discussed so far constitute a potential 
base for the formation of intensive social relations transcending the 




























































































together. There are some networks, however, whose very purpose is 
social relations per se. Typical examples are social gatherings for 
the middle and upper classes in Israel, where officers almost routinely 
meet artists, university people, senior government officials and 
politicians. The composition of such meetings is variable and one 
may assume that each set is the result of the personal selection of 
the hosts. Parallel to such rather elitist meetings, the frequent and 
prolongued reserve duty generates, in addition to its declared purpose, 
a base for the fromation of networks of social relations on every 
level, outside the military framework. Mention should also be made 
here of such popular customs as the adoption of army units by civilian 
settlements and vice versa. Though informal, these linkages serve a 
par excellence solidary social function. The same holds true with 
regard to the Soldiers' Welfare Association, which along with instru­
mental services for individual soldiers and military units, contributes, 
albeit indirectly, to the formation of social networks linking civi­
lians with defense personnel.
Since we are dealing here with extremely diversified social networks, 
many of which display primary group features, their overall attribute 
profile is necessarily somewhat blurred. There is usually no a priori 
institutional definition of each side's position in the hierarchy of 
their relation system. The status of the individual in these networks 
is rather a matter of personal esteem, although military rank or 
official position do affect its evaluation to some extent. Social 
networks formed between reservists and the standing army personnel in 
the framework of reserve service are usually those among equal ranks, 
however even if there is a rank difference, neither partner is, a 
priori, destined to be the senior partner. These networks are chara­
cterized by rather loose, usually bilateral control over the behavior 
of partners in the linkage. The extent of institutionalization is not 
uniform. Most social meetings are only very slightly institutionalized 




























































































Soldier's Welfare Association are both institutionalized and of an 
enduring nature. The rules of the game are in all cases solidary and 
cooperative.
Communicative Networks
The networks in this domain bring together representatives of the IDF 
and public opinion makers from the mass communication media. The 
civilian partners in these meetings are: military correspondents of 
the press, the radio and the TV, and journalists specializing in for­
eign affairs and security. To this we should add a body of special 
importance in this context, viz., the daily papers' editors' committee. 
This committee is periodically meeting senior representatives of the 
defense establishment (usually the Chief of Staff or the Defense Min­
ister) on various issues, and the explicit purpose of these meetings 
is to convey the message of the defense establishment to the general 
public.
The military partners in these networks are the personnel of the IDF's 
speaker's unit, the department of public relations of the Defense 
Ministry, intelligence branch officers, etc. The clients are both the 
citizens in their capacity as consumers of communication in general, 
and the defense establishment. Obviously then, the domain is common to 
both sides. As to the participants' status, whereas the defense esta­
blishment seems to have the unquestionalble advantage due to its 
power to control the channels and the contents of the communication, 
this power does not become converted into formal institutional terms 
a priori defining the hierarchyamong the parties. As in every demo­
cratic society, where the press sees its legitmate mission not only 
in transmission of information, but also in revealing shortcomings and 
failures, the Israeli press representatives have been increasingly 
disinclined to accept an a priori definition of their status in this 
interaction as inferior, with the result of making control of these 




























































































this control is especially poignant in institutionalized communic­
ative networks such as the editors' committee or meetings with mil­
itary correspondents. It follows that the rules of the game include
competitive and conflictive elements, the pattern of which continues
21to be particularly strong in Israel.
The Domain of Symbolic Networks
National revival, collective identity, and patriotism are a few of 
the implicit symoblic meanings that could be attached to the networks 
that have been discussed so far. These symbolic meanings are espe­
cially applicable to the political and cultural domains.
However, some linkages between the defense establishment and civilians 
have clear and manifest symbolic significance as reinforcers of indenti- 
fication with the fundamental norms of the society, an objective which 
is the precise and explicit purpose of the linkage. Such linkages are 
e.g. state celebrations of independence days, national memorial days, 
state funerals, etc. On a more modest level, such is also the purpose 
of ceremonies marking army unit's adoption, or even of inviting parents 
into military camps on such occasions as completion of training series, 
officers' courses, etc.
The emphasis on the common heritage considerably blunts the edge of 
the control over mutual relations in these linkages, at least as far 
as the military is concerned. At the same time, the representatives 
of the civilian sector are - as in political networks - of unambigu­
ously senior status, particularly in the case of national ceremonies 
in which the active role of the military is limited to contributing 
the visual contents (parades, etc.) of these institutionalized frame­
works .
Following this schematic description of major networks which bring 




























































































words to those types of linkages which are conspicuous by their 
absence from the Israeli scene.
On the political level there is the striking absence of a formal insti­
tutional framework with a function similar to that of the National
22Security Council of the US or other countries. Furthermore, soldiers
and officers on active service cannot be elected to public and politi-
23cal bodies such as local authorities or parliament. Political part­
icipation of army personnel is limited in Israel to voting rights and
24the right of passive participation in political assemblies. Another 
linkage connected with both the political and the economic domain, 
which is totally absent in Israel, though quite popular today in sev­
eral Western countries, are trade unions of soldiers and officers.
Their absence is especially striking in view of the enormous political 
and economic power of Israeli trade unions, which in some respects, 
are among the most powerful in the world. The ban on trade unions does 
not, of course, apply to civilian employees of the defense establish­
ment, including those employed by the IDF and the military industrial 
complex.
Among the professional networks, the one conspicuously missing in 
Israel is an elaborate linkage between the civilian and the military 
judiciary systems. Their contact is very limited and expressed mainly 
in the enactment by the Knesset of the Law of Military Jurisdiction 
and the appointment by the President of the State - (at the defense 
minister's recommendation) - of the president of the supreme military 
court of appeal. This appointment has been so far held by senior 
military men. Apart from this, the military judiciary system in fully 
autonomous both with regard to appointments as well as procedure.
Also noteworthy is the absence of institutionalized and legally enacted 
communication channels between servicemen and officers on the one 
hand and representatives of the public on the other in matters of 




























































































and the IDF have developed an effective autonomous system dealing 
with both military personnel and civilian's complaints. The fact 
that the complaint officer of IDF (IDF's ombudsman), is a former 
Chief of General Staff is a measure of the importance attached to 
this function by the defense forces. The defense establishment 
sees this framework as adequate to meet the existing needs and for­
bids uncensored application by army personnel to outsiders, includ­
ing Knesset members.
D. Some Concluding Remarks
The attributes of the institutional linkages described above enable 
us to present at least a tentative picture of the degree of integ­
rality, fragmentality or permeability of various sections of these 
boundaries. We assume that, with the exception of a few cases which 
we shall list below, there are no really integral boundaries between 
the defense and the civilian sectors in Israel. However, it is pos­
sible to discern a high degree of integrality in those cases in 
which: (a) the domain of the institutionalized linkage is either
exclusively that of defense or exclusively civilian; (b) there is 
a clear superiority of one partner's status; (c) the control over the 
interaction is strict and continual, and (d) the rules of the game 
are competitive or conflictive.
At the other extreme will be the permeable boundaries which are 
characteristic of those cases in which: (a) the domain is common to
both parties; (b) there is no clear definition of status hierarchy;
(c) the control over the interaction is minimal; (d) the degree of 
institutionalization is low and (e) the linkage is based on social 
and national solidarity and cooperation.
The range of fragmentary boudaries includes all those cases in which 




























































































blurred. In some cases the domain is exclusive and in other cases 
the domain is common to both parties. In either case, when linkage 
attributes are diversified the location of partners in the status 
hierarchy varies, there is bilateral and rather loose control of the 
interaction, institutionalization is partial rather than comprehens­
ive and the rules of the game are mixed. The rules are sometimes 
competitive and conflictive, sometimes cooperative and solidary, and 
in some cases a combination of all four.
It is hardly possible at this stage of our investigation to classify 
with any accuracy - using the above distinctions - all the sections 
of the inter-sectorial boundaries. Our classification at this stage 
can only be tentative and rather impressionistic. The picture is 
clearer with regard to those few boundary sections between the def­
ense establishment and some specific population groups, which evince 
a high degree of integrality. One such group is the non-Jewish pop­
ulation of Israel, with the exception of the Druze, who are subject 
to the military service law, and the volunteers from the Bedouin and 
the Chercassian community. (Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974: 265-267). 
This population, despite full Israeli citizenship rights, is exempt 
from recruitment into the IDF. The arrangement was made immediately 
upon the declaration of independence and the establishment of the IDF.
Contact between the Moslem and Christian Arab population and the def-
25ense establishment is extremely limited, and the boundaries are 
closed and integral. A similar phenomenon, though produced by dif­
ferent causes, exists also within the Jewish population. It concerns 
the ultra-orthodox Yeshiva students, who are exempted de facto from 
army service and women who declare themselves to be orthodox, thus by 
law being exempt. The analogy is qualified not only because the for­
mer group is Arab and the latter Jewish but also because of the rather 
paradoxical fact that orthodox Jews are not only represented in the
Knesset (this is also true of the Arabs), but because they sometimes




























































































other groups apart from those mentioned above whose recruitment
27into the IDF is limited and selective.
Since, apart from those groups which for political, ideological or 
psychological reasons are not interested in contact with the defense 
establishment, the overwhelming majority of the population is subject 
to recruitment into the IDF, the boundaries between this population 
and the defense establishment are by definition non-integral. Yet, 
even here there exist, as might be remembered from the presentation 
of institutional linkages, several options, including integral bound­
ary symptoms.
Though schematic and illustrated by only a few selective examples, 
our description of institutional linkages should suffice to indicate 
the diversified nature of the inter-institutional boundaries in 
Israel. Moreover, we hope that one may be able to use the variables 
employed here for a more comprehensive comparative study of institu­
tional linkages between elites.
Let me thus summerize the potential advantage of such an approach to 
the understanding of patterns of interaction and confrontation between 
elite groups in general. (This is, of course, in addition to other 
approaches and methodologies).
a) Knowledge about the scope (quantitatively speaking) of linkages 
(or meeting points) and the quality of the participants in terms 
of status, prestige, etc. may give us some illuminating insights 
about the potential chances for interaction between elites or, 
vice-versa, the extent of institutional segregation between the 
various elites.
b) Mapping institutional linkages may help to locate the most promin- 




























































































of the encounters take place. In other words, we may get an 
idea about the multidimensionality of the linkages and the variety 
of participants.
c) Information about the rules of the game that regulate these frame­
works may shed light on the normative climate that characterizes 
these frameworks. We refer here mainly to the cultural climate 
that encourages consensus or, alternatively, dissidence and con­
flicts .
d) Institutional and formal linkages may be compared to the informal 
and less institutionalized linkages, namely the intention is to 
compare the two networks in order to examine the extent of con­
vergence or divergence.
e) The comparison of the two networks may help us to clarify channels 
of mobility and career patterns of the various elites. Moreover, 
it may give an answer to the extent of role expansion of elites 
beyond their institutional boundaries (for example, academicians 
























































































































































































First version of this paper was prepared for the Inter- 
University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Confer­
ence, Chicago, October 23-25, 1980.
For a comprehensive survey of research in this field see 
Strassoldo, 1977.
We might add here that, following their discharge from 
active service, some senior I.D.F. officers have 
expressed dissent from the consensual views of the 
defense establishment, hence possibly also from the norms 
of the Israeli political culture. An outstanding example 
of this is the former Commander of the Airforce,
Gerneral Benjamin Peled.
Such as courage, tenacity of purpose, rigorous discipline, 
rank as a symbol of social distance, groomed appearance, 
etc. (Horowitz, 1979: 11.13; Horowitz, 1977: 62-63).
These changes find expression in the intensification of 
symptoms of what Moskos calls occupational (vs. institu­
tional) orientation (Moskos 1977). Other expressions are 
instances of economic corruption by some of the people who, 
by virtue of their position in the defense establishment 
were in close contact with civilians involved in business 
with the defense establishment.
There are some exceptions here, e.g. the orthodox section 
has contributed less to the officer's corps than to other 
areas of public life in Israel.
For a more systematic discussion see Lissak, 1978: 8-11, 
28-31.
Moskos would probably call this process a change from 
"Occupation to Institution" (Moskos, 1977). See also 
Janowitz's criticism (Janowitz, 1977).
The institutional linkages may be classified into seven 
major domains. Each domain comprises a varying number of 
networks, sometimes homogenous and sometimes diverse with 




























































































The seven domains are: the political, economic, 
educational and cultural, professional, social, 
communication and symbolic networks.
9. In addition to linkages occuring within the defense 
establishment between military personnel and civilian 
employees or other security forces personnel such as 
police or civil guard.
10. See further elaboration of this subject by Horowitz 
(1979). The strength of these tendencies varied in 
different periods.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject on the 
background of the 1973 election campaign see Ben-Dor,
1975: 131-138.
12. The defense budget is about 40% of the 1979/80 national 
budget and 25% - 30% of the GNP.
13. In recent years about 25% of the labour force has been 
employed directly and indirectly by the different 
extensions of the defense establishment.
14. No detailed and up-to-date data on the proportion of 
industrial products purchased locally by the defense 
establishment are available. For partial data see Kochav 
and Lifschitz, 1973: 263-270.
15. An outstandig example of this is the aircraft industry. 
Though originally a branch of the Defense Ministry from 
1968 the legal status has been changed. It became a public 
corporation - Israel's Aircraft Industry.
16. One should not forget that in Israel part of the defense 
industry output is intended for the civilian market. The 
demand for such products comes mainly from the civilian 
metal, chamicals and electronics industries.
17. Such as afforestation, bridge building, etc.
18. e.g. new settlements in the administered territories.
19. This is rare since the defense industries are trying - 
with considerable success - to channel their surplus 
productive capacity into fields in which there is no 




























































































competes with other retail chains by reducing its prices, 
which it can afford to do, due to its superior organiza­
tion and huge turnover.
20. Two additional types are: combat training for soldiers 
on active and reserve service, and pre-recruitment para­
military training for youngsters, combined with educa­
tional activities (Lissak, 1970: 327-334).
21. For a more systematic treatment of the interactions 
between the defense establishment and the mass media 
in Israel, see Lissak, 1981.
22. Although recommendations to set up such a forum have been 
repeatedly made, they have so far not been accepted by 
any Israeli government. The latest such recommendation 
was made by the Agranat Commission (Agranat Commission, 
1975) 27-33.
23. This is the case for example in Germany, Denmark (Jano- 
witz, 1972: 156; Harris, 1975: 36)
24. In the matter of participation in political assemblies 
there were some irregularities in the fifties and 
sixties. Thus, e.g., a certain political forum within 
the Mapai party served as an arena for political 
activities of member of I.D.F. personnel. Another 
example is the protest movement following the Yom Kippur 
War (1973) in which members of the armed forces par­
ticipated.
25. Except for contacts with the military government which 
in the past administered some areas in Isreal, where 
the Arab population is concentrated.
26. The exemption cf Yeshiva students and Orthodox women is 
itself the result of a coalition agreement, ratified 
and expanded by the Likud government.
27. e.g. culturally deprived youth and/or those with 
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